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On Monday, August 4, 2750 tons of Ammonium nitrate exploded at the Beirut port.
The explosion killed around 200 people, injured over 6,000, and destroyed the
homes and livelihoods of an estimated 300,000. A massive catastrophe for the crisis-
ridden country. Years of political deadlock have driven Lebanon in one of the worst
economic crises in its history. The protests of late 2019 successfully overthrew the
government, but the system of political power-sharing and its key players stayed
intact and produced yet another government unable to implement urgently needed
reforms. Despite the government’s resignation one week after the explosion, people
are back on the streets, demanding accountability and in-depth reforms. What are
the chances of change in a state whose institutions have been captured by nepotism
and corruption for decades?
I. A Divided Society
The Lebanese state is based on a consociational power-sharing system, originally
designed as a transition plan to calm inter-religious feuds, which found their peak
in the civil war from 1975 to 1990. Political parties are formed along confessional
divisions. State functions are divided by sects: Parliamentary mandates are
apportioned among the 18 officially recognized confessions, the three most powerful
positions are reserved for the biggest religious groups in the country. The President
of the Republic must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim,
and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim. Most of today’s political leaders
are prominent figures of the civil war or belong to families which have become
inseparable from the top positions of their respective party.
Lebanon is often described as a deeply divided country. The shrinking Christian
population fears to loose power against the Muslim communities. With the Taif
Agreement that ended the civil war in 1990, political representation was divided
equally between Christians and Muslims, despite the growing disparity of their
demographics. This binary division, however, is a classification with little analytic
significance. Another division consolidated in the 2005 Cedars Revolution, ignited by
the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (STL verdict, 18.08.2020),
resulting in the end of the Syrian occupation: The anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance,
lead by the Sunni Future Movement and the second biggest Christian party, the
Lebanese Forces and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, lead by the biggest Christian
Party, the Free Patriotic Movement, alongside the Shia parties, Amal Movement
and Hezbollah. The 2018 parliamentary elections resulted in a clear majority of
the March 8 Alliance (69/38). However, both blocs were represented in a national
unity government, as they were in five out of eight governments since 2005. This
form of political accommodation, with the parliamentary opposition included in the
government, significantly impeded its capacity to act.
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II. The Disaster before the Catastrophe
Although sectarian affiliations remain an important category of political identity
in Lebanon, other fragmentations have become more and more apparent in the
Lebanese society. The protests of late 2019, commonly known as October 17
Revolution, have revealed the frustration of an economically disadvantaged part of
the Lebanese society, across sectarian lines. Furthermore, the protests were lead
by a young generation, a generation willing to overcome the democratic deficit of
consociational power-sharing and corrupt elites. These fragmentation lines (poor/
rich, young/old) have continuously grown in the last couple of years and found their
political manifestation in the protests that overthrew the Hariri government in October
2019. 
However, the formation of a new government in January 2020 demonstrated the
power and resilience of the political elite. Although demands for a government of
technocrats were partially met by the new cabinet that included several university
professors and other experts, appointed to an important political position for the first
time in their career, the power structure in the background remained untouched.
Although the new government broke with the unity formation of its predecessor,
being backed by the March 8 Alliance exclusively, it was unable to implement major
reforms. 
After the past government’s inability to secure the $11 billion pledged by international
donors at the 2018 CEDRE conference on the condition of administrative and fiscal
reforms, the new government failed to negotiate a $10 billion loan program with
the IMF. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the Lebanese economic crisis worsened
drastically. The Lebanese Pound lost up to 80% of its value, 50-60% of the
population plunged below the poverty line, with the already poor struggling to afford
basic foods and services.
In mid-March, the government declared a “state of general mobilization”, restricting
public gatherings and international travel, closing educational institutions, and non-
essential private businesses. Additionally, it imposed nighttime curfews when rising
COVID-19 case numbers were detected. The state’s measures, but also the people’s
self-commitment in light of weak medical infrastructure, decimated the public protest
against the political system, mismanagement, and corruption. 
III. “MY GOVERNMENT DID THIS”
Walking alongside the destroyed port today, black letters mark the concrete
wall next to the sidewalk: “MY GOVERNMENT DID THIS.” Despite the currently
ongoing investigation of the explosion, it has become apparent that the ammonium
nitrate had been stored at the port since 2014. Next to the question of how it was
ignited, the politically pivotal question is, who knew and did nothing to remove the
dangerous chemical compound from Beirut and to store it adequately. Early reports
have claimed that the state’s main institutions, including the government and the
presidency, had been informed several times since 2014, the last time in July 2020. 
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Due to the massive destruction and need for help, major protests did not evolve
until four days later. The state had failed to help the victims of the blast. Rescue
squads were formed by volunteers, who also organized immediate support in the
form of food supply, cleanups, and temporary shelter, while military and police forces
were not be seen. After his ministers started to resign in the days subsequent to the
explosion, prime minister Hassan Diab announced his resignation on Monday, 11
August. 
Two days later, the Lebanese parliament approved a state of emergency, giving
extensive powers to the military for a period of two weeks. The jurisdiction of the
military court was expanded over civilians for “crimes related to the breach of
security”, the military was put in charge to decide whether to prohibit gatherings,
impose house arrests and censor publications. Excessive force to push back
protests has been reported. On Tuesday, 18 August, the general secretary of the
Council of Ministers decided to extend the state of emergency in Beirut for a full
month until September 18, 2020. 
This decision raised harsh criticism as it was not based on the constitutionally
necessary two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers (Art. 65), but on the verbal
approval of President Michael Aoun and caretaker prime minister Hassan Diab.
Moreover, it was not published in the form of a decree with the approval of the
Parliament but a mere administrative statement. Most importantly, the extension
of the state of emergency does not provide relief in the aftermath of the Beirut
catastrophe or additional health measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. It is
rather employed to secure the state and its power structure against the sweeping
anger of the Lebanese public. 
IV. Revolution and Resilience
In the wake of the Beirut explosion, the international community was quick to
respond, notably  France, whose prime minister Emmanuel Macron visited Beirut
two days after the catastrophe. Lebanon’s former colonial power organized an
international summit, which raised over $250 million for emergency aid, directed
to non-governmental organizations on the ground. Additionally, the United Nations
launched a $565 million flash appeal to support relief and recovery efforts. In
dispensing the aid, it will be vital for the international community to avoid Lebanon’s
state institutions, which have suffered from corruption for decades. 
Lebanon is a captured state. It’s institutions have been occupied by the same
group of people since the civil war. The sectarian power-sharing has established
a balanced system of clientelism, nepotism, and corruption. Political leaders are
either born into their role, have been prominent warlords with own militias during
the civil war, or have enough money to enter Lebanese politics successfully. Who
thought prominent political figures, such as the President of the Republic Michel
Aoun, the Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri or the major party leaders Gebran
Bassil (FPM), Saad Hariri (Future Movement), Samir Geagea (Lebanese Forces),
Walid Jumblatt (Progressive Socialist Party) or Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah) would
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assume at least partial responsibility for the political negligence and mismanagement
that paved the way, if not caused, the Beirut explosion, was proved wrong. 
The declaration of the state of emergency and official statements in the last two
weeks have illustrated the political elite’s persisting claim to power. What are their
options? Outgoing prime minister Hassan Diab has called for early elections, which
was echoed by opposition leaders who hope for a strengthened March 14 Alliance.
Early elections would have to be conducted on the basis of the 2017 electoral law,
which introduced minor improvements but failed to provide substantive change
for a gridlocked political sphere. The ruling parties could also aim to form a new
government independently or suggest a return to a national unity government, with
the option of Saad Hariri returning as prime minister.
For the people on the streets, who have continued to fight for change after the
October 17 Revolution, these options are not satisfactory. The return to consensus
politics under the lead of Saad Hariri would annihilate the Revolution‘s only major
accomplishment. Civil society actors have called for a transitional government
with independent members, tasked to prepare a new electoral law on a non-
consociational basis, leading to abolish the institutional deadlock and paving the
way to comprehensive constitutional reform, if not an entirely new constitution.
However, chances of fundamental change are small. Despite the public anger
and the vocal protest movements, many Lebanese would vote again within their
sectarian denomination, if given the chance. The fear of political insignificance, of
cultural overpowering, is present in a society that fought violently for decades to
achieve a state of mutual tolerance. 
V. The Chances of Change
Lebanon is at the brink of becoming a failed state. It is unable to provide basic
services. Electricity breaks have become the rule, not the exception. Public
Education, healthcare, social protection, water supply, and waste management
are just a few of the areas in need of reform. Without an international bailout,
Lebanon’s economic decline won’t stop. Without accountability by the country’s
political leadership, the state’s democratic roots will rot further and give way to a full-
on oligarchy. 
Change overnight is unlikely and although the sectarian bonds are strong, new social
stratifications have evolved into politically relevant communities: a young generation
of Lebanese citizen, Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, without prospects;
a dying middle class; people facing the decision whether to emigrate or to join the
protests for sustainable change. International aid and political pressure combined
with continuous protests and civic engagement might be able to force the political
elite to make concessions over time. A transitional government that listens to the
protest movements instead of weaponizing the military against them is the minimum
requirement for a democratic future in Lebanon.
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